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IAbstract
Unemployment  insurance has been the subject of numerous theoretical  and empirical
studies. These studies elucidate the benefits and the cost of unemployment insurance,
namely, the improved the allocation of risk bearing and the reduced incentives for work.
In the past two decades a branch of the literature has emerged that deals with the optimal
design of unemployment insurance. This literature has been influenced by ideas and
methods from the field of information  economics and theories from the field of labor
economics. The result is a collection of models designed  to highlight a variety of issues
pertaining to the provision of optimal  unemployment insurance.
This paper reviews these issues, summarizes  the relevant literature, assesses its
accomplishments,  and points out problems that require further study.OPTIMAL  UNEMPLOYMENT  INSURANCE:
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Introduction
Unemployment  insurance (Ul) programs vary across countries and over time in terms of
eligibility for benefits,  their size and duration, and methods of financing.' .Eligibility  for
UI benefits may depend on employment  history, the immediate reason for becoming
unemployed,  efforts made to secure new employment, and record of refusal to accept
suitable job offers. The size of the benefits may depend on the unemployed past earnings
and the duration  of the current spell of unemployment.  The duration of UI benefits may
be limited or not. Th;e  program may be financed by one or more of the following
methods: contributions  of employers,  contributions of employees, or from general tax
revenue.
Presumably  these variations reflect attempts  to balance  the benefit of more efficient
allocation of the unemployment  risk and the cost of reduced work incentives  and other
distortions  associated with UI insurance. It is, therefore, not surprising that much of the
theoretical  and empirical research on UI aimed at identifying and assessing  the magnitude
of its various incentive  effects and its impact on unemployment and wages. The
knowledge  thus obtained should prove useful for the purpose of designing optimal UI
programs. These in turn should provide useful guidelines for policy makers and
practitioners  interested in instituting  such programs in countries in which they do not
exist and to reform  programs in countries in which Ul program exist. The purpose of the
present paper, however, is to review the existing literature on optimal UI insurance,  to
assess its accomplishments,  and to point out relevant issues that require further study.
1.1  Unemployment  Risk
The demarcation line between UI and other social insurance programs is not always clear.
In this paper, UI is taken literally to include only programs designed to indemnify  the
unemployed for loss of income resulting from the loss of employment. It is important to
recognize that not every kind of loss of employment constitutes an insurable risk. The
principle used to guide the definition of unemployment risk is the extent to which the loss
of employment  - and, consequently,  of income - is due to circumstances that are, by and
large, beyond the control of the employee.
An employee may become unemployed by quitting his job voluntarily, by being fired for
industrial misconduct  or unsatisfactory  job performance, or as a result of adjustments in
employment required by business considerations of the firm in which he is employed.
Quitting voluntarily  or being fired for industrial misconduct are within the control of the
1  See, for example.  the survey by Atkinson  and Micklewright (1991) of the variation in unemployment insurance
among OECD countries.employee  and, consequently,  do not qualify as unemployment risk. Unsatisfactory  job
performance  is a source of unemployment risk, although in practice it is difficult to
distinguish  from shirking;  job performance may be subject to manipulation by
employees.  Variations in employment that are due to business considerations may be a
response to the introduction  of labor-saving technologies, to reorganization of the firm's
operations,  or to reduced demand for the firm's output. Note, however, that predictable
demand variations, such as seasonal variations in employment of agricultural workers, do
not require UI. Only unanticipated  variations in employment - whether temporary or
permanent,  due to demand shifts or any other reason -justify institution of Ul.
1.2  Preliminary Observations
The literature on optimal UI is relatively new. Its development during the past two
decades have been influenced  by ideas and methods from two main fields of research,
labor economics and economics of information.
From labor economics it borrowed models describing the search behavior of the
unemployed  as well as job-matching models of the labor market. The job-search models
depict the behavior  of the unemployed in terms of an optimal stopping rule in
environments  in which information  concerning job offers appears sequentially and the
decision at each stage is whether to accept a current  job offer or to reject the offer and
continue the search. 2 The job-matching models introduces general equilibrium
considerations  according to which the success of the search effort depends on the relative
number of vacancies and job seekers.
Developments  in the economics of information, especially advances in the theory of
incentive contracts, had a decisive influence on the analysis of optimal Ul schemes. 3
Somewhat less pronounced  was the influence of ideas about incentive compatibility
constraints  and equilibrium  concepts introduced to model markets plagued by adverse
selection  problems.
Some studies of UI were conducted within the framework of partial equilibrium analysis,
while others adopted a general equilibrium approach. Typically, studies of the former
type take the wage rate (wage distribution) as given, thereby disregarding the effects of
UI on the equilibrium.  In general equilibrium models the equilibrium wage rate is
determined  jointly with the parameters of the optimal UI program.
The notion of optimality itself is not uniform across studies. In some studies, typically
those that take the partial equilibrium point of view, the criterion for evaluating
alternative  Ul schemes is minimizing the cost of UI subject to the condition that it attains
a minimum level of expected  utility of the participating individuals. Other studies,
notably those that take the general equilibrium viewpoint, use the criterion  of Pareto
2  For surveys of this literature see Lippman and McCall (1976a, 1976b) and Mortensen (1986).
3 Today analysis of the economic consequences of asymmetric information is a standard topic covered in graduate
textbooks on microeconomics  theory. A more detailed exposition is given in Salanie (1994) and Mach-Stadler  and
Perez-Castrillo  (1997)
2optimality, appropriately  defined for environments characterized by asymmetric
information.  For some purposes the former approach entails no essential loss of
generality, especially  if the economy is assumed to be populated by individuals who, for
the purpose of Ul, are identical. In general, however, the second approach is preferable
since it implies minimizing the cost of UI and is capable of dealing with the choice of the
level of expected utility of diverse groups.
1.3  Asymmetric  Information
Moral hazard and adverse selection problems impede the effectiveness of social
insurance  programs in general and of UI in particular. 4 Hence any attempt to tackle the
problem of the design of optimal UI must begin by identifying and characterizing
potential sources  of private information  pertaining to hidden actions and hidden
characteristics  that give rise to problems of moral hazard, adverse selection, and fraud.
Two kinds of hidden actions may give rise to moral hazard problems in UI: the effort,
time and money, the unemployed person expands to secure new employment and his
implicit willingness  to accept specific job offers, and the effort employees exert
performing  their jobs. Together these influence the duration of the unemployment spell
and the UT  compensation.  Second the effort employees exerted performing their jobs.
Specifically, shirking affects the probability of transition into the state of unemployment.
From the viewpoint  of Ul shirking may be classified as industrial misconduct'
Consequently,  if the unemployment is a direct result of shirking the dismissed employee
is not entitled to Ul. It seems, therefore, that shirking is not a problem. In practice,
however, it may be difficult  to distinguish shirking from incompetence  and to attribute
low level of performance  to voluntary behavior on the part of the employee. Thus, the
probability  of transition to a state of covered unemployment is to some degree subject to
manipulation  by the employee and cannot be dismissed, a  priori, as a source of moral
hazard. The literature on incentive contracts suggests that this issue of motivation is dealt
with by the wage contract. Consequently, in so far as the design of optimal UI is
concerned,  the main question is the analysis of the effect of alternative Ul designs on
resource  allocation in the presence of incentive wage contracts. Note that the issue of
incentive contracts also arises insofar as the behavior of the unemployed is concerned.
There, however, the Ul itself is the incentive contract. Not surprisingly, therefore, most of
the literature  on optimal UT  has focused on this issue.
Two kinds of hidden characteristics  may give rise to adverse selection problems in UI.
First, employees  differ in terms of their preferences for leisure (or, more generally,
nonmarket employment  of their time). These differences may reflect the personalities of
the workers as well as the nonmarket opportunities they face, which may be difficult if
not impossible to monitor. At one extreme are individuals who would rather work even if
the replacement ratio offered as Ul benefit is 100 percent because they derive psychic
pleasure (fulfillment) from their work, at the other extreme are individuals who would
4  See  the discussion  of this point  in Diamond  (1993
3rather be unemployed  even without UI benefits. After having a baby, for example, a new
parent may decide to stay home regardless of whether he or she is covered by Ul.
A second source of private information  that may give rise to adverse selection is due to
firm-specific  risk. Each firm or industry is subject to demand variations or technological
changes  that bear upon future employment prospects. These changes become apparent to
insiders including management  and employees, long before they are perceived by
outsiders, including the provider of Ul. For instance, insiders may observe well in
advance of outsiders that insufficient  orders or plans to install new equipment are likely
to result in work force redundancy and eventual unemployment. Employees who find
themselves in this kind of situation are more inclined to take out UI.
In the context of UI, the different characteristics  of either firms or individuals interact
with their actions, producing an effect that tends to exacerbate the problem of adverse
selection.  This effect, termed endogenous adverse selection  by Chiu and Kami (1998), is
the result of imperfect  experience rating. To grasp this notion, suppose that UI is financed
by contributions by employees and consider the optimal job search policies of individuals
characterized  by a distinct preference  for leisure. Specifically, (ceteris paribus)
unemployed individuals  with stronger preference for leisure are characterized  by a higher
reservation wage and are less likely to accept a job offer than individuals characterized by
a weak preference  for leisure. Hence, individuals of the first type tend to remain
unemployed longer and, consequently, represent more risky prospects to the UI provider
than individuals of the second type. In principle this difference in risk should be reflected
in the UI premium paid by the different types so that each type would bear the full social
cost of its policy. In practice, however, the reservation wages are private information and,
consequently,  experience rating is, at best, imperfect. Under imperfect experience rating
neither type internalizes the entire social cost of its job search strategy. Consequently,
both types tend to adopt more selective  job search policies, which increases the overall
unemployment  rate and the total cost of UI. Moreover, the job search behavior of the
high-risk type is subsidized by the low-risk type.
Similar distortions arise with regard to the layoff policies of firns  characterized  by
distinct firm-specific  risks. Consider an economy in which, as in the U.S., the UI program
is financed through contributions by employers. Ceteris  paribus, employees of firms
characterized  by high firm-specific risk are more likely to be laid off than employees of
low-risk firms. They, therefore represent more risky prospects from the viewpoint of UI.
In principle,  these variation in riskiness should be reflected in the UI contribution  of the
respective  employers.  In practice, however, experience rating of employers is imperfect
and employment  in high-risk firms is implicitly subsidized  by the employees in the low-
risk firms. Imperfect  experience rating means that firns of all types adopt more
aggressive  layoff policies, which tends to increase the overall rate of unemployment. 5
Furthermore,  this cross subsidization  by artificially lowering the cost of employment in
This  issue was first raised by Feldstein  (1976,  1978) who  claimed  that a significant  part of the unemployment  in the
U.S., where firms pay the Ul premium in the form of payroll tax, is due to layoff policies that are made affordable by
imperfect  experience  rating.  See also Ehrenberg  and Oxana  (1976).  Topel  and Welch  (1980),  and Topel  (1983,  1984).
4high-risk sectors of the economy and increasing it in the low-risk  sectors tends to  distort
the allocation of employment.
Finally, difficulties monitoring the activities of the unemployed give rise to UI fraud. The
provider of UI may find it costly and perhaps practically impossible to ascertain that
individuals receiving UI benefits are, in fact, unemployed.  In such circumstances the
unemployed are tempted to conceal the fact that they have found employment so that they
can continue to collect their benefits. This behavior increases the cost of UI and defeats
the purpose of the program.
In the next section we review the literature on optimal UI that has addressed these issues
and identify the main insights it provides. This limited objective means that the vast
literature on the positive economics of UI is ignored. Section 3 contains a discussion of
the accomplishments  of this literature and points out questions and areas that require
further study.
2.  Literature Review
2.1  Analytical Ideas and Empirical Findings
Much of the literature on UI has been devoted to the study of the effect of UI benefits on
the duration of unemployment  spells. This literature emphasizes the moral hazard
problem created  by insufficient  monitoring of job search  efforts. Strongly influenced  by
the work of Mortensen (1977), this literature addresses  two aspects of the problem: the
intensity of efforts made to secure new employment and the willingness of the
unemployed to accept a job offer. To model the situation, Mortensen regards job search
as a process of sequential sampling from a distribution  of wage offers.
In many situations involving sampling from a known distribution, the optimal search
strategy is characterized by a reservation wage property. This means that, prior to
obtaining a new observation,  there is a wage rate such that if the new observation exceeds
that level then the offer is accepted and search terminates, otherwise the offer is rejected
and search continues. Hence, ceteris paribus, the higher the reservation wage the less
likely the unemployed is to accept an offer at any given stage of the process and,
consequently, the longer is the duration of the unemployment  spell.
In Moretensen's  model, job search  takes the form of a sequential  sampling from a known
distribution of wage offers, F with no recall. 6 Sampling takes place over time, and the
probability of generating  a job offer during a given time interval, h, is assumed to be
proportional to the fraction of the period devoted to search. The cost of search is taken to
be the value of forgone leisure, which depends on the person's income, including UI
benefits. The probability of being laid-off  during any given interval is assumed to be
constant and independent  of the worker's  actions.
6 No recall means that a job that is not accepted when offered is not be available at a later date.
5Individuals in this model are assumed to pursue search strategies so as to maximize the
expected sum of discounted utility of the future stream of income-leisure combination,
taking into account the ever-present unemployment  risk and Ul benefits. Individuals are
assumed to consume their income in each period, so there is no self-insurance against
unemployment  risks. To qualify for unemployment  compensation,  an individual must
have held ajob prior to entering the state of unemployment  and he or she must have been
laid-off (as opposed to voluntarily quitting). Qualified  unemployed individuals are
entitled to unemployment compensation  for a limited time. Hence, their job searclrefforts
in each period are affect by the benefit rate, which is assumed  constant,  as well as the
time remaining before their entitlement period is exhausted.
The probability that an unemployed worker will make the transition from the state of
unemployment  to employment during a time interval,  the escape  rate, equals the product
of the probability of generating a job offer, which is a function of the intensity of the
search effort, and the probability of accepting the offer, which depends on the individual's
reservation wage. The escape rate, q, is given by:
q=c(l  -F(o)),
where ca  is the probability of generating  a job offer and c) is the reservation wage. Notice
that the escape rate is inversely related  to the average duration of the unemployment
spell. For a fixed escape rate,  q, the expected unemployment  spell is given by:
D(q)=  f  vqe'"dv  =  1
Mortensen's analysis shows that:
(1)  The escape  rate of a qualified worker who has not exhausted  his unemployment
benefits  increases  with the duration of the unemployment spell. This result is due to the
fact that the reservation wage is set at the point at which the worker is indifferent between
remaining unemployed and taking a job at the reservation  wage. The optimal level of
search intensity is set at the point at which the marginal (indirect) utility of time allocated
to search equals the marginal utility of leisure. As the unemployed approaches the limit
on the duration of UI benefits, the utility associated with remaining unemployed declines.
This induces the unemployed to lower his reservation wage and at the same time to
increase the intensity of his search, both of which have the effect of increasing the escape
rate. By the same logic, unemployed individuals who are either unqualified for UI or
have exhausted their benefits will select a constant search effort and reservation wage
and, consequently, will have a constant escape rate.
(2)  The escape  rate of newly  unemployed individuals  decreases  with the duration  of the
benefit period  If consumption  and leisure are complementary  goods,  then the escape rate
decreases  when the benefit rate increases.  These comparative statics results reflect the
6fact that an increase in either the size or the duration of unemployment  benefits tend to
increase the reservation wage. This is the traditional incentive effect. Moreover, an
increase in unemployment benefits reduces  the expected return to search. In addition, if
consumption and leisure are complements  then an increase in the benefit rate increases
the value of leisure. Both these factors tend to reduce the search intensity and,
consequently,  the escape rate.
(3)  The escape rate of unemployed individuals who are not receiving unemployment
benefits increases with both the benefit rate and the duration of the benefit  period. The
rationale underlying this conclusion is that improved UI terms increase the expected
utility in future unemployment states. However, to qualify for unemployment  benefits in
the future, an individual must first find employment.
Mortensen's work was not intended to study the welfare implications of UI or the design
of such program. Yet several aspects of this work are relevant for our purpose. First, the
model provides a framework for the analysis of the incentive effects of UI on job search.
Second, the analysis underscores the differential effects of UI on search depending on the
state of the searcher. Third, by emphasizing the difference in the incentive effects of UI
on unemployed  receiving benefits and unemployed not qualified for such benefits, the
analysis highlights the role of employment as mean of creating UI-capital (i.e., by
building eligibility for future UI benefits).
An empirical study of the validity of the predictions of Mortensen's model and estimation
of the effects of the UI variables on the duration of the unemployment spells is provided
by Meyer (1990).7 More specifically, Meyer postulated an instantaneous escape (hazard)
rate function,  i, (.), of the following form:
AiD,  t)=l  (t) exp(zi (t)  ' ,l),
where A  0(t) is the base line hazard at time t, which is unknown;  z, (t) is a vector of
explanatory  variables for individual i at time t; and ,B  is a vector of unknown  parameters.
The explanatory  variables include the number of dependents, marital status, race, age,
state unemployment  rate, UI benefit level, pre-UI after tax wage, and variables
representing the duration of the period until the benefits lapse. The probability that an
unemployment  spell lasts until time t+1 conditional on its lasting up to period t is given
by:
Pr[TŽ  >t  +1  r >t ] = exp[-  J  i, (s)ds  ]
where Ti is the duration of individual i unemployment spell. If zi(t) is assumed constant
between t and t +1, then substituting for . i from the previous equation we get:
7Meyer  uses data  from Continuous  Wage  and Benefit History  which  includes males  from twelve  state in the U.S.
during the period 1978-1983.
7Pr[T,>t+ 1  jT,>t  ]+exp[(zi(t}Yf)+  Int fI'(s)ds].
The escape rates were estimated using several specifications. Insofar as our main interest
is concerned, the following conclusions are worth noting:
(1) High Ul benefits reduce the escape rate. In particular, a 1Opercent  increase in the UI
benefits is associated with 8.8 percent decrease in the escape rate, suggesting that Ul
benefits have strong disincentive effect. Put differently, the estimated effect of a 10
percentage point increase in the replacement  ratio is to increase the duration of
unemployment  spells by about one and a half weeks. (These estimates are somewhat
higher than those obtained in other studies and they apply to the period before Ul benefits
are exhausted.)
(2)  The main effect of the duration of the  period until benefits are exhausted is at the
outset of the unemployment  spell andjust before benefits lapse. More specifically, "the
point estimates imply that moving from 54 to 41 weeks until exhaustion raise the hazard
by 46 percent. The hazard is essentially flat between 46 and 6 weeks, but the point
estimate imply small decrease in the hazard. Between 6 and 2 weeks before benefit
exhaustion the hazard rises 109 percent. One week away the hazard rises additional 95
percent" [Meyer (1990), p. 780].
While these findings do not constitute a test of Mortensen's theory, they suggest
substantial disincentive effects of UI benefits. The large increase in the escape rate
toward the exhaustion of the benefit period suggests that the anticipated  decline
(elimination)  of these benefits also has a strong effect. The fact that the escape rate also
increases  at the outset of the unemployment spell may be explained  by the prevalence of
temporary layoffs. The relation between Ul and temporary layoff is a subject that
received much attention and will be discussed in the sequel.
2.2  Optimal Ul and the Role of Saving
Both the theoretical and empirical analyses of the effects of Ul on the duration of
unemployment  spells are exercises in positive economics and, as such, take the
parameters of the Ul program as given. These studies underscore the incentive
implications of UT  and, consequently, raise the issue of the design of Ul program that
strikes the best balance between the benefits associated with consumption smoothing and
the adverse impact on the incentives to work. This issue was first address in Baily
(I 977a, 1  977b) in the framework of a two-period consumption-saving  model with a
second period income risk;.  The income risk is interpreted as loss of income due to
unemployment.  The risk of losing one's job is exogenous. However, the income loss
depends on the duration of the unemployment spell and is affected by the job search
effort and the reservation wage.
gIn the absence of Ul, saving is a form of self-insurance intended to smooth consumption
over time. Since saving entails sacrificing  current consumption in exchange for future
consumption, he optimal level of saving occurs when the marginal utility of a dollar
saved equals the expected discounted  marginal utility of future consumption. In the event
that the individual is employed in the second period, he consumes too much; in the event
that he is unemployed, he consumes too little. The shortcoming of saving as a mean of
self-insurance  is that, unlike UI, it is not a contingent claim against future consumption.
Under symmetric  information,  actuarially  fair UI will replace that part of household
saving intended as a precaution against unemployment  risk. Moreover, fair UI induces
individuals to take out full insurance  which renders consumption independent of the state
of employment.  However, if the job search effort of the unemployed person is private
information,  then full UI insurance  reduces the motivation to work, thereby distorting the
job search process and increasing the duration of the unemployment spell.
Baily (I 977a) addresses  the issue of optimal Ul in a model with homogenous work force
and private information  regarding  job search efforts. The assumption of a homogenous
population simplifies the analysis, since the social welfare function coincides with the
expected utility of the representative  worker. Assuming UI that is financed by
proportional income tax and operating under balanced budget, Baily examines the
necessary conditions under which of the UI benefits are optimal. He finds that, at the
optimal level, the marginal benefits of consumption  smoothing equal the welfare loss
associated with the marginal  increase in the average unemployment spell. He then
considers the possible effect of redundancy  payment (i.e., a lump-sum  payment upon
becoming unemployed)  on the adverse effect of Ul. Unlike the regular Ul benefits, which
are paid periodically, a redundancy  payment does not have the adverse incentive effects.
Thus, it is welfare enhancing in the restricted setup of Baily's model .This conclusion
does not take into account the consumption smoothing  advantage of UI if the
unemployment  spell is prolonged,  however. Moreover, if the probability of becoming
unemployed is affected by the employee's  performance and if this performance is subject
to manipulation, redundancy payment may create a moral hazard problem of a different
type. A worker who is likely to find new employment quickly will intentionally  perforn
poorly in order to be dismissed and collect the redundancy payment. Furthermore, if the
experience rating is not accurate, firms will exploit the situation by adopting a policy of
short-terrn  layoffs that would perrnit the workers to collect the redundancy payment.
The work of Baily is important in that it addressed for the first time the issue of the
design of optimal UI program. Moreover, it underscores some possible implications of
UI. It does so, however, in the context of a model that is too simple in some important
respects. First, the assumption  that dismissal from a job is exogenous and, in particular,
unaffected by job performance,  leaves out potentially important sources of moral hazard.
Second, the model does not consider the effects of Ul on firm behavior. Third, the use of
a representative agent, in addition to begging important issues concerning the welfare
criterion, deprives  the model of the ability to deal with hidden characteristics  of workers
that may give rise to significant  adverse selection problems. 8
8Baily  (1977b) mentions  the potential adverse selection problem and recognizes that in reality not all workers are alike
and may differ in their lay-off probability. However,  he regards this as a potential problem for the provision of private
9An alternative analysis of optimal Ul emphasizing  the role of saving and capital markets
imperfections  is provided by Flemming (1977) who proposes several variations of a
model of an economy in which homogeneous  individuals work, consume, and save. Each
individual in the economy is subject to idiosyncratic  exogenous unemployment risk. If
unemployed,  the individual  receives UI benefits and engages in a search for new
employment. The probability of finding a new job in any time interval is an increasing
function of the amount of money (in one version, the amount of time) invested in search.
The assumption  that both individuals and jobs are homogeneous  means that the wage rate
is the same for every worker and every  job. Thus the search problem facing the
unemployed is how much money (or time) to spend looking for new job. It does not
include a decision about  the reservation wage; in other words, every job that is found is
accepted. The only source of heterogeneity in these models is employment history, which
is captured by the individuals'  wealth positions.
Ul is financed by taxes, and the benefits are proportional to the duration of the
unemployment  spell. The budget of the Ul program is supposed to be balanced on
average, but it need not be balanced every year. The objective function of the program is
the maximization of the sum of individuals' indirect utilities of wealth which turns out to
be the weighted average of the expected indirect utilities of employed and unemployed
individuals, with weights given by the employment  and unemployment rates,
respectively, and expectations  taken with respect to the distribution of wealth in the two
groups. However,  the wealth distribution may change over time, which means the
objective function is a moving target. In other words, the optimal design of the Ul
program is sensitive to the particular period for which the objective is defined. Moreover,
as pointed out by Flemming, Ul affects the level of precautionary saving and,
consequently,  the rate of capital accumulation.  Hence its welfare effect evolves through
time according to the path of capital accumulation induced by the choice of UI.
Flemming solves the problem of optimal UI numerically for specific utility functions
under two alternative  assumptions regarding the capital markets: perfect capital markets
and no capital markets. Since perfect capital markets afford better opportunities for
consumption smoothing,  it is not surprising that, for the specific parameter values chosen
to solve the model, the optimal replacement  ratio is lower (approximately 50 percent)
under perfect capital markets than in the absence of capital markets.
Building upon the work of Baily and Flemming, Davidson and Woodbury (1997)
investigate the optimal Ul program, focusing on the relation between the optimal
replacement  ratio and the duration of the Ul benefits. For an analytical framework they
use an equilibrium search model in which workers are either employed at an equilibrium
wage rate, co;  unemployed  receiving Ul benefits,  x; or unemployed and after T periods,
having exhausted  their benefits, receiving no income. Employees lose their jobs as a
result of exogenous  random shocks; upon becoming unemployed they engage in job
search. This search is costly and the probability of success depends on the vacancy rate as
well as the number of total job applications submitted. The unemployed choose their
Ul. The compulsory  nature  of government  Ul programs  overcomes  the problem  adverse  selection  presents  for the
private provision of U[, but it does not address the issue of gains and losses from the program.
10search  effort optimally, given the equilibrium  wage and the parameters of the UI
program. Ul is financed by a proportional wage tax.
The complexity  of the model defies closed form solution, and Davidson and Woodbury
resort to calibration methods  to obtain the optimal structure of the Ul program. However,
two general qualitative results are obtained that do not depend on the specific calibration:
First, as in Mortensen's  analysis, when the duration of the UI benefits is finite, the
optimal search effort increases throughout  the unemployment  spell and individuals that
exhaust  their benefits or are ineligible for UI search more intensively than others. Thus
although  the effort spent looking for a job is private information, the limited duration of
the benefit period provides the incentive  necessary to induce worker to engage in job
search. Second, (for every given actuarial value of benefits the optimal UI requires
unlimited duration of the benefit period). To grasp this conclusion fix the actuarial value
of the benefits and compare the welfare of a person upon becoming unemployed under
two alternative  UI programs. The first alternative provides him the full actuarial value of
the benefits during the first unemployment  period; the second alternative spreads the
benefits over two consecutive  periods contingent  on his remaining unemployed. Under
the first altemative the individual  may save some of his benefits to finance his second-
period consumption.  However,  as we already observed, since savings is not a contingent
asset, it is not as efficient mean of dealing with unemployment  risk as UI. Hence the
individual  is better off under the second alternative. The same reasoning applies to any
number of periods. Thus under optimal UI, the duration of the benefit period is indefinite.
Moreover, lowering  the UI benefits and extending the period tends to reduce search
efforts, which further increases individual welfare.
The reasoning so far is based on the assumption that the actuarial present value of the
benefits remain intact. However,  the lower search effort tends to increase the
unemployment  spell and reduce the tax revenues that finance the UI program. Hence
general equilibrium  considerations gives rise to the possibility that the indirect adverse
effects of extending the benefit period outweigh the beneficial direct effects. This,
Davidson and Woodbury  claim, is unlikely in the context of their model.
Employing the calibration method and using estimates form the literature and from the
Illinois Reemployment  Bonus Experiment,  Davidson and Woodbury figure that the
optimal  UI program calls for an infinite duration of benefits with a replacement ratio of
about 0.5. However,  if the duration of coverage is restricted, the replacement  ration
increases,  with full replacement  attained when the duration of coverage is 32 weeks.
Finally,  Davidson and Woodbury discuss the effects on their results of variations in the
specification of the model, including the introduction on unemployed individuals
ineligible for UI, saving, risk aversion, and endogenizing the random process that cause
individuals lose their jobs.
2.3  Benefits  Schedule
The literature on incentive  contracts in the presence of moral hazard emphasizes the
tension between the desire to allocate risk bearing efficiently and the need to induce the
11agent (the informed party) to choose the action that is optimal from the point of view of
the principal (the uninformed party.) In general, optimal incentive contracts attain
second-best  allocations by exposing the (risk-averse) agents to more risk than would be
efficient if the actions taken by the agents could be freely monitored. The risk borne by
the agents stems from the need to relate the payoff to the outcome so as to induce the
choice of appropriate action (or to exert the appropriate level of effort.) Unemployment
insurance contracts whose primary purpose is to attain an improved allocation of the
unemployment  risk are no exception. Shavell and Weiss (1977) exploit this analogy to
address the issue of the optimal schedule of UI benefits.
If the actions taken by the unemployed to find new employment were public information,
then UI contracts would need to address solely the issue of the optimal allocation of risk
bearing. In this hypothetical  case, if the objective of the Ul program is to enable the
unemployed to attain a prespecified  level of discounted expected utility at minimum
discounted expected cost and the subjective rate of discount is equal to the market rate of
discount, then UI benefits should be scheduled so as to equate over time the marginal
utility of the unemployed consumption.  This, in turn, means that UI benefits may be
either constant (if the initial wealth of the unemployed is zero) or zero at the outset of the
unemployment  spell and then increase for a while as the unemployed depletes his initial
wealth; once the wealth is depleted, benefits attain a permanent level for the remainder of
the unemployment spell. The lack of monitoring makes it possible for the unemployed to
take a leisurely attitude toward finding a new job or be more selective in accepting job
offers without suffering the full consequences. To formalize this idea, Shavell and Weiss
model the job search process as sequential draws from wage distributions and assume
that the optimal search strategy is characterized by a reservation wage property.
However, rather than taking the wage distribution as given they assume that the pertinent
wage distribution depends on the unemployed's job search efforts. Formally, the
probability of obtaining a job in period t as a function of the effort, e,, and reservation
wage, w,*,  is given by
p(a):  , e,)  fg  (co  le  )dO
wheref( j e,  ) denotes the density function of w, conditional on the search effort level, el.
The unemployed is assumed to plan ahead and choose a sequence of effort levels and
reservation wages, p{e,,  }  ,=,,  so as to maximize his discounted expected utility. This
choice deternines the probability of employment and, consequently, the cost of the UI
program. Moreover, the optimal choice of effort and reservation wage depends on the UI
benefits.
The policymaker (that is, the principal) is supposed to choose an unemployment  benefits
schedule. {b,  }r , with the objective of minimizing the expected discounted sum of UI
benefits subject to the constraint that the unemployed attain a given level of expected
discounted utility, while taking into account their optimal choice of effort and reservation
wages. The main insight provided  by the analysis of this problem is that if the
12unemployed  agent has no wealth to begin with and has no access to borrowing,  then the
optimal UI benefits should decline over time, approaching  zero in the limit.
The intuitive explanation of this conclusion relies on the fact that, since the unemployed
chooses the level of effort and the reservation wage in each period optimally, actuarially
fair variations in the stream of benefits have no first-order effect on his expected utility.
A lowering of the future benefits, however, does affect the probability  of finding and
accepting a new job, thus lowering the cost of the UI program. More precisely, since the
subjective  rate of discount of the unemployed is the same as that of the provider of UI, if
it was not for the incentive effects the UI benefits should be uniformly spread over the
duration of the unemployment spell. Following Shavell and Weiss, let b, =  b, +  and
consider an actuarially fair variation in these benefits increasing b, (that is, db, + [(1 -
P(w  ,e,,))/(l+r)]db,±i  = 0, db, >0.) Since b, = b,+ 1 to begin with, the marginal utilities of
the benefits are the same. Hence this variation of benefits has no direct effect on the
unemployed's  expected utility. Moreover, by the envelope theorem, the indirect effect on
the unemployed's expected utility resulting from the changes in the endogenous variables
- namely, the reservation wage and the level of effort -are negligible. However,  the
decline in future benefits makes the prospect of remaining  unemployed less attractive,
thereby inducing the unemployed to search more vigorously and to lower his reservation
wage. The result is an increase in the probability of finding new employment  and a
reduction in the expected cost of the UI program. (For a simple model of Ul with moral-
hazard and an analysis of the optimal benefit schedule see Appendix part A.)
No clear-cut  conclusions emerge when the unemployed has some wealth to start with or
when he can borrow. On the one hand, UI benefits must be kept low and rising at the
outset of the unemployment spell to deplete the initial wealth; on the other hand, benefits
must decline in order to induce the necessary level of job search effort and willingness  to
accept  job offers. It can be shown that within the framework  of Shavell  and Weiss, the
optimal UI benefits schedule implies that the level of effort increases and the reservation
wage declines over the unemployment  spell. Together these imply that the escape rate
increases  the longer the unemployed is out of work. The rationale for this result is that the
declining unemployment benefits mean that, given a level of effort and a reservation
wage, the expected utility associated with these conditional on the person being
unemployed at time t is larger then the expected utility conditional on being unemployed
at time  t+ 1. Thus the optimal response is to increase the level of effort and to reduce the
reservation wage rate.
The analysis of Shavell and Weiss focuses exclusively  on the moral hazard problem
associated with the inability of the UI provider to monitor the job search efforts and
reservation wage of the unemployed. The main insight of this analysis  is that the problem
is best dealt with if the UI benefits decline monotonically with the duration of the
unemployment  spell. This conclusion seems robust, although some issues concerning the
design of the UI benefits remain unsettled. To begin with, the criterion  for optimality
used by Shavell and Weiss is the minimization of the cost of Ul program subject to the
constraint that the unemployed are ensured a given level of expected utility. This criterion
disregards other welfare aspects of UI program, such as the efficiency implications  of job
13search. A prolonged  job search, while obviously costly in terms of output forgone,
increases the chance of placing the unemployed where his marginal productivity is
higher. Some of this efficiency is lost when the incentives lead to a reduction in the
reservation wage. By the same token, the increase in job search effort tends to improve
this aspect of efficiency.
A different issue concerns the modeling of job search effort. In contrast to Mortensen
(1977) who defines job search effort in terms of the time spent looking for ajob,  Shavell
and Weiss model job search effort more abstractly as a source of disutility that produces a
stochastically dominating shift in the distribution of wage offers. The advantage of the
Mortensen formulation is that effort is empirically observable, its disadvantage is that the
analysis is complicated since effort interacts with income (or consumption). Shavell and
Weiss avoid this complication  by treating effort as additively separable source of
disutility. They do not explain, however, what will be an empirical counterpart  of this
concept. Moreover, the separability of the (dis)utility of effort and consumption is
necessary for their conclusions. Since effort seems to be an elusive concept, this raises
concern regarding the robustness of the conclusions.
Finally, it is not clear how the optimal UI benefits schedule is to be implemented, since
the parameters include the unobservable utility of the unemployed. Specifically,  the
assumption  that all unemployed are identical seems unacceptable.  However,  without this
assumption  it is far from obvious that it is possible to individualize  the benefits so as to
provide the recipients the predetermined levels of expected utility.
The analysis of Shavell and Weiss is predicated on the implicit assumption that the only
means by which the provider of UI may reward or punish the unemployed - and, thereby,
induce the appropriate  job search effort - are unemployment  benefits. Building upon this
work, Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) discuss the design of an optimal UI program in
which the insurer's power to reward or punish includes the ability to tax or supplement
the insuree's  income after he is reemployed. While taxes or income subsidies that depend
on the unemployment history are not a feature of existing UI programs, if used correctly,
the increased flexibility afforded by the extended set of punishments  and rewards have
positive welfare implications. More specifically, under the improved design the same
level of utility for each individual is attainable  at lower cost.
Hopenhayn and Nicolini model the relationship  between the unemployment  insurer and
insurees as a repeated principal-agent  relationships with moral hazard. The key feature of
their model is that the likelihood of finding new employment in any given period depends
on the search effort of the unemployed, which is private information.  Unlike the model of
Shavell and Weiss in which neither the effort nor the job offers received by the
unemployed are observed, Hopenhayn and Nicolini assume that only the job search
efforts are not observed. In other words, the provider of Ul is able to monitor at no cost
the job offers received by the unemployed. Obviously unrealistic, this assumption is
analytically  convenient, since it implies that the unemployed cannot decide his
reservation wage.
14The unemployment  insurer in this model is a risk-neutral agent whose objective is to
minimize the expected  present value of the cost of UI benefits. Individuals are risk averse
and behave as if they maximize the expected discounted sum of their utility of
consumption and disutility of job search effort. The rate of discount is the same for the
unemployment  insurer and the insurees. Unemployment  insurance is a contract between
the Ul provider  and the individual specifying a transfer payment from the insurer to the
individual  and a level of job search effort in each period as a function of the
unemployment  history of the individual. Formally, a contract is a function r : Ht
R+xR where H, is the set of employment histories. An employment history is represented
by a sequence of zeros and ones denoting, respectively, periods in which the individual
was employed and periods in which he was unemployed;  (e 1, b,)  E R+xR  represent the
levels of job search  effort and UI benefits in period t.
To simplify  their analysis,  Hopenhayn and Nicolini assume that all jobs are identical and
pay the same wage, co, and that once employed the individual remains employed forever.
This assumption  restricts the set of possible employment histories to sequences that start
with zeros; once a one appears the rest of the sequence is ones. This assumption implies
that Ul insurance  is sold only to unemployed individuals. Moreover, by ruling out future
unemployment,  this assumption also nullifies Mortensen's (1977) "entitlement  effect" of
unemployment  insurance. The probability of finding employment in period t is an
increasing,  concave function,  p(e, ), of the level of effort, et, satisfying the Inada
conditions.
A crucial  assumption in the formulation of the UT  program as a repeated principal-agent
problem is that the UI provider can control the consumption level of the agent in every
period. A possible rationale for this assumption  is that insured individuals cannot save
and have no access to credit. We defer further discussion of this assumption  until after we
gain better understanding  of the model and its implication. At this point it suffices to note
that the insuree's  consumption  level is chosen directly by the Ul provider, since it is equal
to the UI benefits when the insuree is unemployed and it is equal to the insuree's
disposable  income in the employment state. (The disposable income equals the wage rate
net of taxes imposed by the UI program.)
The objective function of the Ul program is to minimize the cost of providing  UI
insurance  subject to the participation constraint which requires that, at the outset, the
expected  utility of the individuals do not fall short of an exogenously given reservation
level, and the incentive compatibility constraints on the level of effort. Note that after
having  enrolled in the Ul program, the expected utility corresponding  to the state of
unemployment  is determined  endogenously. Indeed, under the optimal UI scheme the
level of expected  utility will decline as a function of the duration of the unemployment
spell.
The analysis of the optimal UI scheme is based on the assumption that the cost of
providing UI is a convex function of the reservation utility level of the unemployed. This
analysis  leads to two main conclusions:
15(a) UI benefits must decline with the duration of the unemployment  spell. This conclusion
is similar to that of Shavell and Weiss and is based on the same logic. To motivate the
unemployed  to exert some effort looking for employment, the expected utility associated
with remaining unemployed  must decline over time. Since the unemployed chooses his
level of effort optimally, the effect of decreasing the reservation utility level is captured
by the increasing  marginal utility of consumption. But the consumption level is equal to
the Ul benefits. Hence these benefit must decline as the duration of the unemployment
spell increases.
(b) The tax imposed  on the insurees after theyfind employment depends on the duration
of the unemployment  spell prior to  finding ajob. Moreover, under some technical
conditions on p (e), the tax is increasing  as a  function of the duration of the
unemployment  spell. Notice that this conclusion is not merely that a tax needs to be
imposed  on the income of the employed. Rather it requires that this tax depend on the
duration of the preceding unemployment  spell. This idea carries the logic of the previous
argument a step forward by observing that the consumption smoothing and incentive
roles of Ul insurance does not have to stop on the threshold of employment. In fact, if the
optimal consumption  stream could be chosen for the entire lifetime of the insured rather
than just for the unemployment  spell, the same level of incentive could be attained with
lower cost in terms of efficiency.  Put differently, if the Ul provider can control only
consumption  spending during the unemployment spell then it is possible that the
consumption  level increases once employment starts. The optimal allocation of
consumption over time would require that some of this consumption is shifted to the
unemployment  periods, thereby increasing the overall level of utility of the insuree
without  a corresponding  increase in the cost of insurance. This is the consumption
smoothing  aspect of UI. If the tax were to be independent of the duration of the
unemployment  spell,  then the need to lower the UI benefits during the period of
unemployment  would mean that the consumption level associated with long
unemployment  spells would be too low relative to the consumption level associated with
employment. If the tax increases with the duration of the unemployment spell, the same
level of incentives  can be attained with smaller distortion of the consumption stream.
Hence the expected  utility level of the insuree can be attained at lower cost to the insurer.
To get an idea of the potential social gains from the proposed unemployment tax,
Hopenhayen  and Nicolini use empirical results based on U.S. data to calibrate their
model and calculate the gain from implementing their scheme over the optimal UI
scheme that does not involve a tax on the employed. Postulating a constant relative risk
aversion  utility function and assuming that p(e) = 1 -exp (- re), they show that with the
tax the decrease in benefits over the unemployment spell is considerably more moderate
and the gain may be anywhere  from 15 to 35 percent, depending on the reservation utility
level of the individual.
An immediate  practical difficulty with this result arises from the fact that the model does
not recognize individuals who do not participate in the labor force. This omission permits
the selling of Ul to unemployed individuals, since they all would rather work. However,
16if there were individuals that would rather not work, the aforementioned  scheme would
involve a transfer of wealth from labor force participants to nonparticipants  that may well
exceed the possible gain from the optimal scheme. This last observation is more of a
criticism of the particular model than of the main insight, namely, that individuals buying
insurance should be taxed according to their unemployment  history.
2.4  General Equilibrium  Analysis of UIwith Moral Hazard
Thus far the analysis of the economic effects of Ul was carried out in the framework of
partial equilibrium analysis.  As we have emphasized,  this begs potentially important
welfare implications of Ul, such as the distortions introduced by the additional taxes
needed to finance the Ul program  or the effect on the wage rate itself.
Employing a quantitative  dynamic general equilibrium approach, Hansen and
Imrohoroglu (1992) estimate the potential of the welfare effects of alternative UI
schemes. They introduce a rather simple model to described the employment dynamics.
To begin with,.all individuals are assumed to be identical in terms of both their
preferences and their productivity.  Preferences are characterized by a Cobb-Douglas
utility function on consumption  and leisure displaying constant relative risk aversion.
Individuals face idiosyncratic unemployment  risks. The idiosyncratic  unemployment risk
is described  by a matrix  of transition  probabilities  [pJ, where  Pr{  s,+I  = i I St=  }  i, j  E  I
e, u}, where e is the a state of employment, u is the state of unemployment, and s, is the
employment state in period t. Individuals may accumulate  assets, but they are not allowed
to borrow. In each period every individual  either receives a job offer or does not. If he
does not receive an offer he remains unemployed for the duration of the period. If he
receives a job offer he must decide to accept it or reject it. If he reject the offer he stays
unemployed for at least one period.
All unemployment  insurance programs have the following features: (a) Individuals that
qualify for Ul receive payment equal to 0 percent of their wages (recall that all workers
are equally productive, hence the equilibrium  wage is the same for all.) (b) Monitoring is
imperfect so that an individual who is offered ajob in period t and declines to take it will
not be detected and will collect Ul benefits with probability 7r(s,l), where s,_l  is the
employment status of the individual  in the preceding period. (c) UI is financed by a
proportional tax on all incomes  and is actuarially fair.
Clearly, UT  in this economy helps smooth individual  consumption spending over time,
thereby reducing the need for self-insurance  through saving. However, if the benefits of
the program are generous and the level of monitoring low, a moral hazard problem arises
as individuals are more inclined  to take their chances and reject employment
opportunities.
A stationary general equilibrium in this economy is a set of consumption, employment,
and asset-holding functions  of the state variables (wealth, last period employment status,
last period employment decision,  and the Ul benefits policy) a time-invariant  distribution
of individuals over the set of states, and a tax rate satisfying the following  conditions: (a)
17For each individual consumption, asset-holding  and employment decisions are made so
as to maximize the expected discounted sum of that individual's utility. (b) Aggregate
consumption equals aggregate output. (c) The UI program is actuarially sound (that is,
self-financing).
The benchmark for the evaluation of alternative  UI programs is the allocation (of
consumption over time of each individual and employment) attainable  by a fully
inforned social planner. In other words, it is the first-best allocation that maximizes the
expected discounted utility of an individual subject to the constraint that his expected
consumption in the employment and unemployment state does not exceeds the output in
each period.  The social planner is free to choose the employment probability provided it
does not exceeds an exogenous value determined by the transition probability matrix.
Using the calibration methods, the authors proceed to solve the model numerically under
alternative assumptions regarding the replacement  rate, 0,  and the monitoring of the UI
program. They show that if each individual's  job market behavior is perfectly monitored
and if UI insurance benefits are denied to individuals  who are offered employment and
decline to take it, then, with the appropriate choice of replacement  ratio, the first-best
welfare level is attainable as an equilibrium outcome. However, if monitoring is
imperfect, the moral hazard problem that arises implies a welfare loss. Furthermore,
many configurations  of replacement ratios and monitoring levels result in welfare loss
that exceeds the loss of welfare that would occur if no UI were offered at all.
The work of Hansen and Imrohoroglu underscores  the need to consider the general
equilibrium implications of UI program, in particular, the need to take account of the
distorting effects of taxes required to sustain such a program and the need to base its
evaluation on the broader criterion of welfare maximization rather than the criterion  of
minimizing its cost.
A different approach to the welfare analysis of UI in the context of general equilibrium
model is taken by Fredriksson  and Holmlund (1998), who look at the incentive effects of
Ul on job search. The analytical  framework is a job matching model and the social
welfare function used to evaluated alternative UI programs is the weighted sum of
individual utilities.
Fredriksson  and Holmlund distinguish among three labor market states: employment,
insured unemployment,  and uninsured unemployment,  where transition among the three
states is random. More specifically, workers lose their  jobs and enter the insured
unemployment state according to exogenously  given rate 0.  Insured employees are
entitled to Ul benefits at a constant replacement  rate, b, per period; uninsured employees
are entitle to social assistance, z, per period. Let u/ and uN denote the number of the
insured unemployed and uninsured unemployed,  respectively.
Unemployed individuals search for new employment.  The arrival rate of employment
opportunities depends on the  job search effort, e},j  =  {I,N}, which is measured by
proportion of the time they allocate to job search and by a measure of the tightness of the
18labor market, expressed as the ratio, p,ofjob vacancies to the effective number of
employment  seekers. Specifically, the net hiring, H, in a given period is characterized by
a job matching, constant  return to scale, function
H = H(S,v)
I  I  VNN
where S denotes the effective employment seekers, defined as S = e u  + e  u  , and v
denotes  job vacancies.  Thus, the escape rate from the insured unemployment to the
employment state is d = eJ H (1, p),  J = (I, N}. Finally, the transition from the insured
unemployment state to the uninsured unemployment state takes place at a constant,
exogenously  given, average rate, X.  Notice, however, that for each individual  the
transition is random.
Workers and firms engage in wage bargaining the outcome of which is the Nash
bargaining solution. Since the fall-back position of employees is the state of insured
unemployment,  the threat point of each worker is assumed to be the utility of the insured
unemployed.  This assumption  implies that an increase in the UI benefits improves the
bargaining position  of the workers and, as a result, exerts pressure on the equilibrium
wage rate.
Fredriksson  and Holmlund assume that employees do not save and the unemployed
cannot borrow to smooth their consumption. The unemployed choose the intensity of
their search efforts so as to maximize the discounted sum of their expected  utilities. UI
benefits and social assistance are financed by a tax on wages.
Given an UI program  that specifies a replacement  rate, a social assistance program, and a
tax rate r an equilibrium  in this model is search intensities, el and e X and a wage rate, c
such that e'and eN  and maximize the individual utilities, the wage rate is determined by
the Nash bargaining solution, the labor-market clearing conditions:
o(  1  P  N  )=a  I  aI  uN
and
aNuN  =2u'
hold, and the balanced budget constraint
r(l-u'  -u)=  buJ = zuN
is satisfied.
The first labor market clearing condition requires that the flow from the employment
state to the insured unemployment  state (the expression on the left-hand side) is equal to
the flow from the two unemployment  states to the employment state (the expression on
the right-hand side.) The second labor market clearing condition requires  that the flow
from the uninsured unemployment  state is equal to the flow into the uninsured
unemployment  state.
19The social welfare function is taken to be the weighted sum of individual utilities in the
different labor market states, the weights being the proportion of the population in each
state.
The first question concerns the optimality of the equilibrium in this economy. The answer
is obvious once we realize that individual search efforts have positive externalities.  In
particular, an increase in the job search effort tends to reduce the equilibrium rate of
unemployment and, consequently, the unemployment expenditure, or taxes. Since -
individuals not are compensated fully for their search effort, the equilibrium
search intensity is suboptimal.
The second result is that optimal U] benefits must exceed the level of social assistance. If
one regards social assistance as a continuation of UI benefits, the latter result seems
analogous to the conclusion of Shavell and Weiss (1979) that optimal Ul benefits decline
over time. However, the driving forces behind these conclusions are different. This
difference underscores the role of distinct incentives. Whereas the conclusion of Shavell
and Weiss is driven by the fact that, when the benefits are uniform, a variation in the
benefit rates will have a net incentive effect, the present result derives from the combined
influences of the "entitlement effect" first noted by Mortensen ( 1977) and the fact that
the search effort in equilibrium is suboptimal. More specifically, the assumption  that
individuals enter the insured unemployment state only from the employed state means
that, starting from optimal uniform benefits (i.e., b*=z*,) an increase in the benefits
associated with the insured unemployment state will have the effect of increasing the
search effort of the uninsured unemployed. Together with the fact that search effort in
equilibrium is suboptimal this implies an increased social welfare.
The analysis of Fredriksson  and Holmlund (1998) highlights the implications of the
externalities of job search effort and the role of the entitlement effect for the
unemployment  insurance program. Their main conclusion is that unemployment  benefits
should decline over time. Certain features of their model, however, raise some concern
regarding the robustness of the main result. First, as the authors recognize, the
assumption that employees do not save is unrealistic. Yet, as the analysis of Shavell and
Weiss (1979) indicates, this assumption is critical. It may well be the case that, if wealth
accumulation  by employees is permitted, then the optimal UI insurance may require that
the benefits decline at the outset of the unemployment spell. This consideration  tends to
mitigate and may even dominate the entitlement effect. Second, the assumed exogeneity
of the rate of transition from the employment state to the insured unemployment state
begs the potentially important issue of the effect of the UI program on this rate.
Specifically, better UI benefits encourage shirking. Thus in equilibrium the level of effort
exerted by the employee performing his job is suboptimal for the same reason that the
search effort is suboptimal. Consequently, if the probability of transition from the
employment state to the state of insured unemployment is affected by the employees'  job
performance  then, other things equal, a higher level of benefits in the insured state tend to
reduce social welfare. Finally, the assumption  that the transition from the insured to the
uninsured state is a random process at the individual level introduces another unrealistic
20feature; it seems obvious that, in a society of risk averse individuals, this artificially
imposed idiosyncratic  risk entails unnecessary loss of welfare.
2.5  Shirking
A different aspect of moral hazard associated with Ul has to do with imperfect
monitoring of the level of effort exerted by employees in discharging  their duties. There
are many instances in which the effort of individual workers  is not observable directly
and may not be accurately inferred from observing the level of output. The latter  problem
arises when output is the result of team effort rather than the effort of particular
employees, or when output is random. In these circumstances  the employer-employee
relationship is subject to the usual agency problem. To induce employees to exert the
desired levels of effort, wage contracts include the threat of dismissal if the performance
of an individual worker or a team is judged inadequate.  The incentive to perform is
motivated in part by fear of losing one's  job. Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) present a model
in which voluntary unemployment  is an equilibrium phenomenon whose purpose is to
deter shirking. To the extent that UI mitigates the economic  hardship associated  with
unemployment,  it reduces the deterrence effect and, by consequence, workers  may be
more inclined to shirk. The probability of transition from the employment state to the
unemployment state thus becomes endogenous,  presumably increasing with
improvements  in the terms of UI.
Wang and Williamson (1996) study a dynamic model of an economy with Ul and two
sources of moral hazard: moral hazard associated with private information  regarding the
unemployed's  job search effort and moral hazard associated with private information
concerning job performance effort. They do not distinguish between the two types of
effort and do not attempt to specify  their empirical counterparts. As in the model of
Shavell and Weiss (1979), effort is an abstract source of disutility  to the agent that
increases the probability-of  being retained if the worker is currently employed and the
probability of generating a job offer if unemployed.
In other respects the model of Wang and Williamson is not essentially different from
earlier models. Individuals in this model maximize the discounted sum of expected
utility, which is additively separable in consumption and effort; they are risk averse; and
their lifetime is random. Moreover, individuals do not save and may not borrow to
smooth their consumption spending. Optimal unemployment  insurance is modeled as a
steady-state solution  to a dynamic principal-agent  problem. The provider of UI seeks to
minimize the program's cost (defined as the steady-state aggregate  consumption minus
the steady-state  aggregate output) subject to the constraint that every new entrant of the
labor force be ensured a given level of expected utility. In addition, in each period
participation  constraints require that the steady-state  expected utility corresponding  to the
states of employment and unemployment  do not fall short of the expected utility that
individuals can attain without UT,  and incentive compatibility  constraints that ensure that
agents will select the prescribed levels of efforts corresponding  to the state of
employment and unemployment.
21The stochastic process underlying  the individual risks has three components: the
probability of death, which is exogenous and fixed in every period and is the same
regardless of the employment state of the individual;  the risk of losing one's job, the
probability of which is monotonic decreasing function of the level of work effort; and the
risk of continued unemployment,  the probability  of which is a decreasing function of the
level of job search effort.
To analyze  the implications  of their model, Wang and Williamson calibrate it using U.S.
data and compute the optimal Ul program. They then estimate its effects under the
assumption  that the guaranteed  expected lifetime utility of new labor force entrants is
such that the budget of the UI program is balanced.  Their main findings are as follows:
(a) The optimal Ul benefits of the unemployed  decrease initially and then increase  and
fall gradually after that. This conclusion seems to contradict  the findings of Shavell and
Weiss (1979) and of Hopenhayen  and Nicolini (1997)  that benefits are monotonically
decreasing. It suggests  that the need to deter shirking calls for severe punishment in the
initial period of unemployment.
(b) Compared with current unemployment  insurance in the US., implementing optimal
UI would result in a welfare gain and a decline in the rate of unemployment.  This
conclusion is somewhat  surprising. It suggests  that the incentives built into the optimal
UI program outweigh the negative incentives associated with consumption smoothing.
(c) The consumption level (benefits) of the employed increase  in the initial  period
following reemployment  and then  fall. This conclusion contradicts  the findings of
Hopenhayen  and Nicolini (1997) that the tax on wages following an unemployment  spell
should decrease monotonically over time. I see no obvious explanation for this finding.
These findings suggest that the effects of Ul on shirking may be an important factor
shaping the design of the optimal UI program. Unfortunately,  direct empirical evidence
on this point is lacking. Thus, pending further study, we must resort to speculation.
In his discussion of the work of Wang and Williamson, Hopenhayen  (1996) claims,
correctly, that the presence of private information about the work effort is presumably
dealt with by wage contracts themselves. If UI increase the tendency to shirk, wage
contracts will be adjusted to counteract this effect. Therefore the net result is that shirking
is not an important consideration  in the design of Ul.
A different conclusion is implied  by the analysis of Chiu and Karni (1998). They note
that unemployment insurance  is unique in that it has never been provided by the private
sector. Supposing that this extreme form of market failure is due to asymmetric
information,  they develop a model of Ul that they use to study conditions for the
existence of equilibrium with no UI. It turns out that the two key elements  whose
interaction accounts for the nonexistence of private Ul in competitive equilibrium are: the
presence of individuals in the populations that, in some periods, prefer not working and
the ability of the employee  to affect the probability of being dismissed through shirking.
22It is interesting  to note that asymmetric  infornation regarding  job search effort is a
contributing factor in the sense of making the conditions for no unemployment insurance
equilibrium more likely to be met. However, it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient
condition for this result. This argument, in conjunction with the fact that no UI was ever
provided by the private sector, suggests that shirking may actually be more important
than is generally perceived.
Poor performance  may be due to factors outside the worker's control, the result of
shirking, or the consequence  of incompetence.  If the employee wants to keep his job,
incentive contracts can be designed  to make him exert the level of effort desired by the
employer. However, if a worker is not interested in keeping his job, he is unlikely to
respond to the incentives  built into the contract. Yet the employer may be hard pressed to
attribute poor performance  to shirking or, more generally, misconduct (in which case the
worker may not be entitled to unemployment  benefits) as opposed to incompetence.
This discussion suggests  that asymmetric information  about effort exerted by employees
in performing their  jobs cannot be dismissed,  on a priori grounds as being unimportant
for the design of Ulprograms. The lack of empirical evidence on the effect of UI benefits
on this type of effort leaves an important  gap in our knowledge.
2.6  Experience Rating
To attain an efficient allocation of the unemployment  risk, the UI premia should reflect
variations in the risk of unemployment  among employees due to personal characteristics
and actions as well as variations due to the employment policies of the firms in which
they are employed. In other words, employees seeking UI should, in principle, be
experience rated by their personal employment risk and the risk associated with the their
employers. In practice,  however, such experience rating is not perfect; as a result, Ul
entails a certain amount of cross-subsidization  among individuals and firms. The fact that
high-risk employees or firms do not internalize  the full cost of their employment policies
creates a moral hazard problem that tends to increase the frequency and duration of
unemployment spells.
Insofar as optimal UI is concerned, imperfect experience rating may reflect the fact that
firms' employment  records are imperfect indicators of their lay-off policies and
individuals'  employment  records are imperfect indicators of their work ethics and search
behavior. Since the unemployment  record is, to a significant  extent, the result of hidden
actions or hidden characteristics,  the problems posed by imperfect experience rating are
the usual problem of moral hazard and adverse selection.
Mortensen (1983) studies the welfare implications  of imperfect experience rating of UI.
He compares the first-best UI design under perfect experience rating to second-best
designs without experience  rating. For this study he postulates an economy in which the
worker's value of marginal product is random. Workers are laid off or remain
unemployed whenever  the value of their marginal product falls short of a reservation
level, z. This assumption  is open to alternative interpretations. One interpretation is in
23terns  of search unemployment.  According to this interpretation  z represents the
reservation  wage characterizing  the job search policy of the unemployed. In competitive
equilibrium  the wage offer reflects the value of marginal product. Hence if the value of
marginal  product falls short of the unemployed reservation wage, the offer is rejected and
the unemployment  is prolonged. According to the second interpretation  employment is
governed  by an implicit contract according to which employees are laid off whenever the
value of their marginal product falls below z9. Employment contracts are pairs (y,z) in
which  y represents the instantaneous income contingent on being employed.
Let  b(z)denote  the stationary equilibrium probability of the unemployment  state. 0(z)
also represents  the equilibrium rate of unemployment.)  Mortensen assumes that all
employees are identical and that the representative employees' instantaneous expected
stationary utility under the contract (y,z)  is given by
S(z}u(x + b - c) + (1 - 0(z))u(y)
where x denotes income generated  by household production, b denotes UI benefits, and
c is the cost associated with searching for employment. Employees are risk averse, thus u
is monotonic increasing and concave.
Firms are risk neutral, and their expected profit from employing a worker under the
contract (y,z) is given by
Z(y, z, t) = (  - A(z)UO(z)  - y - t)
where t is the UI premium (or UI tax) and zr(z) is the expected  value of marginal product
conditional  on it being no less that the reservation level z.
The UI program is said to be self-financed  if
t(1 - 0(z)) = bo(z).
Given an Ul program (b,t) a competitive equilibrium in this economy is a set of contracts
such that: all contracts offer the same expected utility to the employees, each contract
maximizes the expected profit of the firm offering it, and the least-profitable  employer
earns zero expected  profit.
The competitive  equilibrium is obtained as a solution to the program: Maximize the
employees'  stationary expected  utility with respect to z and y subject to the constraint
7C(y,  z,  t)>O.
For a survey of the literature on implicit contracts in its relation to labor markets see Rosen ( 1985).
24If UI is based on perfect experience rating, then each firm is required to pay a premium
corresponding  to the risk it represents, which in this model is a function of is reservation
level, $z.$ Thus under experience rating the premium is given by
t(z)=O(- 0(Z)  b
If the firrns are charged UI premium according to the above formula, their choice of
employment contract fully internalizes the cost of unemployment. Under this condition
(which also implies that the UI is actuarially fair,) competitive equilibrium corresponds  to
efficient allocation of the unemployment  risk. Note, howvever,  that since the firms are risk
neutral and the employees are risk averse efficient allocation of risk bearing requires that
the employment contracts guarantee  the employees the same income across the states of
employment and unemployment. Indeed, in the implicit contract interpretation  of the
model the optimal UI benefit is the difference  between the equilibrium income in the
employment state, y* and the exogenously  given alternative value of time in the
unemployment state. In the search unemployment interpretation,  the cost ofjob  search
reduces the alternative value of time in the unemployment state. Thus the optimal UI
benefit equals the difference between the equilibrium income in the employment state
and the alternative  value of time in the unemployment  state net of the associated search
cost. In both cases the optimal UI benefits increase in response to either an increase in the
productivity  of labor or a mean-preserving  spread of the distribution of the value of
marginal product, both of which increase the equilibrium  value of the income in the
employment state. Furthermore,  if the UI benefits are not set at the optimal level, then an
increase in benefits induces an increase in the reservation value, z, and consequently in
the unemployment  rate if and only if the benefit is below its optimal level.
In practice, the employment policies of firms or individuals (i.e., their choice of
reservation levels) are costly to monitor. Hence even under an optimal UI program  the
experience  rating is bound to be imperfect. This gives rise to a moral hazard problem,
since firms and individuals do not internalize  the full social cost of their choice of
reservation level. Mortensen (1983) examines the polar case in which there is no
experience  rating at all. In this case each firm in the implicit contract interpretation  and
each individual in the search unemployment interpretation  is a '  UI-premium  taker." In
other words, the firm in the former case and the individual in the latter case consider the
UI tax and benefit to be independent  of their employment policies. This means that the UI
tax is regarded (mistakenly  from a social viewpoint) as an additional cost of employment
and the corresponding  UI benefit is not considered a cost of not employing a worker.
Similarly, the unemployed searching for employment does not consider the benefit as an
extra cost of not accepting a job offer. Thus the cost-benefit analysis of employment
policies is biased against employment. Consequently,  given a tax-benefit  pair (t,  b), the
choice of the reservation level tends to be too high, and the unemployment  rate increases
accordingly.
Furthermore, even though the UI program is self-financing  and hence fair in a global
sense. by only considering the UI tax as cost, individual employers and workers behave
25as if the Ul is actuarially unfair and thus seek less than full insurance. Put differently,
given the tax-benefit pair, the equilibrium wage contracts are such that the income in the
employment state exceeds the income in the unemployment  state.
The institution of Ul program, even if optimally designed is bound to raise the
reservation level and cause an increase in unemployment.  (In fact, increases in both the
UI tax and benefit tend to increase the reservation level.) Even so, optimally designed UW
program can be shown to be welfare enhancing. The benefit of reduced  variability of
income  associated with the unemployment  risk due to UI exceeds ihe cost of rising
unemployment  due to the UIprogram.
2.7  Adverse Selection
Unlike moral hazard problems, which have been studied extensively,  problems of adverse
selection have received only scant attention in discussions of optimal UI. This is not
because the problems associated with the presence of private information  regarding
hidden characteristics are less important.  In fact, hidden characteristics  can be an
important factor curtailing the benefits of UI as suggested by the following  example of
firm-specific  adverse selection.
During the 1982-83  recession a voluntary Canadian unemployment  insurance plan,
Career Guard, was introduced to provide unemployment  insurance for executives.  To
mitigate the obvious problem of individuals taking out insurance  policies upon learning
that they are about to lose their jobs, the insurance policy did not cover executives fired
within 6 months of purchasing insurance.  The exclusionary  period failed to protect the -
program, however, since a very high proportion of those who purchased insurance were
dismissed by their employers following  the 6-month qualifying period. "It appeared that
Career Guard failed primarily because of adverse selection -those executives  who knew
they were likely to be dismissed were the main purchasers of insurance, and the insurer
could not distinguish high-risk from low-risk customers."  (Green and Ridell [1  993]).
Insurance market failure due to adverse selection is often cited to justify the public
provision of UI. The explanation of Chiu and Karni (1998) of the absence of private
provision of UI relies in an essential way on adverse selection associated with private
infornation concerning individuals'  preferences for leisure. According to this
explanation,  the presence of employees who, at some period of their life, would rather not
work combined with their ability to manipulate the probability of losing their job by
shirking may make it impossible  for UI to be privately provided  in competitive
equilibrium. Yet with fewy  exceptions the literature on optimal UI has failed to address
this issue.
One exception is Mortensen (1983). who examines the welfare implication  of UI with no
experience rating in the presence of two types of workers, differentiated  solely by their
opportunity cost of time. The difference  in the opportunity cost of time induces a
difference in the corresponding reservation wage rates. Specifically, individuals with a
higher alternative value of time find unemployment less costly and will implement more
26selective employment policy based on higher reservation wage. This entails that
individuals with higher opportunity time cost are unemployment-prone  and represent
higher risk. It is worth noting in this context that, unlike in the usual analysis of adverse
selection  (see, for example, Rothschild and Stiglitz [1976]),  in which the risk type is
exogenous, in the present analysis the risk is the result of behavior induced by other
personal characteristics,  namely, the opportunity cost of time. Since the reservation wage
is not readily observable,  this phenomenon gives rise to an adverse selection  problem.
Thus UI contracts that are actuarially sound if taken out by the low-risk type will attract
the high-risk types and thereby become insolvent.
Mortensen examines the menus of UI contracts (that is, UI tax-benefit pairs) that are
incentive compatible (that is, each type prefers its contract over the contract of the other
type.) He shows that different possible solutions may arise depending on the level of risk
aversion. One solution implies a first-best allocation in which each type is offered an
actuarially fair contract designed to reflects its own characteristics.  In this case the
presence of high-risk type do not prevent the offering of optimal contracts to the low-risk
type. Another solution is likely to arise when risk aversion is relatively low. In this case
separating contracts, each of which is actuarially sound and satisfies the incentive
compatibility constraints, exist. However, since one of the incentive compatibility
constraint is binding, there exists an actuarially fair pooling contract that Pareto
dominates the separating contracts. This analysis compares only two extreme solutions:
pooling contracts versus separate, actuarially fair contracts that satisfy the incentive
compatibility constraints. It disregards the possibility of equilibrium with partial
experience rating in which separate contracts that pool subgroups of individuals with
cross-subsidization  may actually Pareto dominate mandatory global pooling under a
government sponsored UI program. (A simple model of optimal UI in the presence of
endogenous adverse selection is described and analyzed in the Appendix, part B.)
3.  Summary and Conclusions
The fact that no private provision of UI has ever been observed suggests an extreme form
of market failure. Presumably  the same factors that hinder the provision of Ul by the
private sector are likely to impede the effectiveness of public UI insurance. In this paper
we identified sources of private information that are likely to impinge upon UI and
surveyed the way they were dealt with in the literature on optimal UI. Our review
underscores the alternative  approaches to modeling the labor market in the presence of
asymmetric information and highlights their implications for the design of optimal UI.
The variety of approaches to modeling the labor market makes some of the results model
specific and thus difficult to compare. Nevertheless, a consensus about some aspects of
the formulation  of the problem of optimal UI exists and some conclusions emerge that
seem robust with respect to model
specification.
271. The main objective of UI is to enable households to smooth their consumption
spending in the  face of unemployment  risk. The risk involved is the loss of earnings in the
event of unanticipated unemployment.  Unemployment insurance,  being a contingent
claim, dominates saving as a mean of consumption smoothing.
2.  The durations of unemployment  spells depend on the intensity  of the  job search
activities of the unemployed and their search strategies. While the search intensity, or
effort, is a generic aspect of modeling labor market, the exact interpretation  of what this
intensity means in practice is not always spelled out. Implicitly search effort means
spending time and money acquiring information about  job vacancies, filling out job
applications, and showing up for interviews. Thus a formal treatment of search effort
requires explicit attention to the interaction of consumption  and leisure. Unfortunately,
this is not easy to do; as a result, the issue has not been addressed  by the literature.
Optimal search strategy is assumed to be characterized by reservation wage. This
approach is convenient and appropriate when sampling is from known distributions;  it is
less appropriate when sampling is also associated with learning about the wage
distribution.
3.  Under the optimal UW  scheme benefits decline with the duration of the unemployment
spell. The intensity of search and the reservation wage are private information giving rise
to a moral hazard problem. This problem requires forgoing some of the benefits from
consumption smoothing in order to induce the appropriate level of search effort and to
lower the reservation wage. The work so far suggests the if the only source of moral
hazard is search behavior and the unemployed wealth is relatively small, then to produce
the right incentives, Ul benefits must decrease as a function of the duration of the
unemployment spell.
Two related results are also noted: First, the duration of the benefits period should be
unlimited even though this entails reduced replacement ratio. Second, the UI premium
paid by employees following an unemployment  spell should increase as a function of the
duration of the spell. The latter result should be interpreted with some caution since it
was established in a context in which the only source of moral hazard is the search
behavior. Ifjob performance itself is subject to manipulation by employees, then high Ul
premium may have adverse effects on the motivation to work and increase
unemployment.
4.  Under  an optimal UI  scheme, premiums should be based on extensive experience
rating. Firms and individuals have hidden characteristics  that, in the absence of perfect
experience rating, interact with their actions to produce a phenomenon  called endogenous
adverse selection. The presence of endogenous adverse selection  makes first-best
allocation of unemployment  risk bearing unattainable. Experience  rating is costly and
perfect experience rating is likely to be infeasible and nonoptimal.  However, to minimize
the impact of endogenous adverse selection experience rating should be incorporated  in
optimal UI schemes.
28Rich and diverse as is the literature on optimal UI has failed to address several issues
that, a priori, seem no less important  than some of the issues that have been discussed at
length. To conclude our discussion, we comment briefly on these omissions:
(a)  Unemployment  insurance  fraud.  If the Ul agency lacks the means of monitoring the
employment of unemployed  individuals receiving benefits, these individuals will be
tempted to conceal the fact that they have found new employment in order to collect the
benefits. Deterrence of UI fraud requires an enforcement  mechanism that will detect
fraud and a legal framework  that will penalize fraudulent behavior. Information collected
by tax agencies that track the employment status of labor force participants should prove
useful for enforcement  purposes.
(b) Aggregate risk.  Unemployment  is strongly correlated with business cycle thus
representing significant  aggregate risk. To spread over time the budget of the Ul program
must be flexible, allowing to run into deficits during recessions and accumulate surpluses
in periods of high employment.
(c) Administrative costs. Operating an Ul program is costly, yet the various models of
optimal UI are based on the assumption that programs are actuarially  fair. If an Ul
program is to be self-financing,  the premium should be loaded to cover the costs of its
administration. In such a case, it is well known that full insurance is not optimal even
when there are no problems of moral hazard or adverse selection.  This suggests that a
minimum deductible should be part of the structure of the benefits, possibly excluding an
initial period of unemployment  from the coverage.
(d) Labor  force participation. The discussion  of optimal UT  takes place in the context of
models in which there are states of employment and various states of unemployment.
There is hardly a mention of the presence of individuals who are out of the labor force,
either temporarily or permanently.  Yet the presence of such individuals, who constitute a
significant part of the population in every country, may impinge on the provision of UI.
To begin with, individuals not in the labor force are difficult to distinguish from the
unemployed. Yet in an obvious sense they do not face unemployment  risk and are
irrelevant for the purpose of UI. It is thus necessary to devise criteria for eligibility that
would deny Ul to individuals  who are not in the labor force  but not to individuals who
are unemployed. Since willingness  to work is private information,  this raises an adverse
selection problem.
(e) Pooling and separating Ul contracts. Most of the work on optimal UT  is based on
the implicit assumption  that the programs entail pooling all employees under a uniform
contract. This assumption  is natural when all individuals are identical and may be
justified when individuals have distinct hidden characteristics.' 0 In reality individuals
'° The latter assumption is not separated fromn  the specification  of the objective function of the program. On this point.
see the discussion in Crocker and Snow (1985)
29have observable characteristics,  such as profession, occupation, education, age, family
situation, as well as employment  history, that may allow their classification into distinct
risk categories. It makes sense for optimal UI program to include separate contracts
designed  to fit the risk characteristics  of the different groups.
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33APPENDIX
A. Unemployment  Insurance and Moral  Hazard: The following is a simple example
illustrating the nature of the optimal UI benefits in the presence of moral hazard problem.
Consider an UI program with the following  features: If an insured person is laid-off he is
entitled to UI benefits up to two consecutive  periods provided he remains unemployed
during these two periods. More specifically,  upon losing his job the unemployed person
receives the first period's UI benefit, b,. During that period he engages in job search.. If
he is successful he is reemployed  at the outset of the second period at the competitive
wage rate, w. If he is unsuccessful he receives, at the outset of the second period the
second (final) installment of his UI benefits, b2.
Assume that the probability, p(e), of finding  a new job depends on the search effort, e,
of the unemployed person, where  is a monotonic increasing and concave function. In
other words, increased  job-search effort increase the likelihood of success but is subject
to the law of diminishing marginal returns. Assume, moreover, that the level of job
search effort is private information  (that is, it may not be observe by the provider of UI).
Unemployed individuals are assumed to choose a level of effort so as to maximize the
expected discounted sum of their utilities. Formally, an unemployed person chooses the
level of e so as to maximize:
v(b 1)+ 5[p(ev(w)+ (1  - p(e))v(b 2 )]-  el
where a  is the discount factor and v(.) is monotonic increasing  concave utility function.
The objective of the UI program is to ensure the unemployed a minimum level of
discounted expected  utility, vo, at minimum cost. The cost of UI insurance is given by:
C(bl,,h2  )= b +  I  (1-p(e))b,,
l+r
where r  is the market interest rate. Suppose  that
l+r
Claim: The optimal Ul benefit schedule  satisfies b, > b2.
The claim is that, in view of the moral hazard problem, the optimal Ul benefit schedule
requires that the benefit decrease with the duration of the duration of the unemployment
spell. To prove this claim we formulate the problem of the design of the benefits schedule
as a principal-agent  problem.
34Choose b1, b2, and e so as to maximize
- [b  + 1r  (1  - p(e))b 2]
subject to:
a. incentive compatibility constraints:
p(e)v(w)+ (I - p(e))v(b 2 )- e 2 p(e')v(w)+ (1  - p(e'))v(b 2 )-  e', for all e'
b. participation  constraint:
v(b1)+ (IIp(e)v(w)  + (1  - p(e))v(b2 )]-  e 2 v  .
Observation:  Since p(.) is concave the 'first order approach  " is validfor this problem..
Hence, the incentive compatibility constraints may be replaced by the  following first
order condition:
-1  + p'(elv(W)-  V(b2 )] = 0.
The Lagrangian expression for the "first order approach" is as follows:
L.(b,,b2,  e,  A,u)=-  b, +-I(l  - p(e*)2  +
2{v(b 1)+ g[p(e)v(w)+  (1- p(e))v(b 2 )]- e - v. }±+  y{-  1  + p'(eAv(w)-  v(b 2 )]},
where 2 Ž 0 and  u are the Lagrange multipliers.  Differentiating  L with respect to b,, b2,
and e and denoting by asterisks the optimal values of the variables we obtain the
(necessary) conditions:
ab=  -I  +2iv'(b,  )= O.
ab2  = - 1  ( - p(e' ))+ [2(l - p(e ))v'(b )-  ,p'(e  )v'(b2  )=  O.
and
-e=  I+r p'(e),,  + 9up`(e[v(w)- vQ)3=O.
The first condition implies:
35l  i
Since a  = 1(1 + r) the second condition implies:
1  I  p'(e)
The third condition implies:
=~~~
8 P(e  X(w) -v(b; f
But, our assumptions about  p(.) imply that p'(e')>  0 and p"(e  )< 0.  Hence, if the
replacement  rate of UI is smaller than 100 percent, that is, w > b* then p > 0. Hence, the
first two necessary conditions imply: v'(b*)> v'(b,*) But v is concave, thus b, > b*. This
completes the proof of the claim.
B. Unemployment  Insurance and Adverse Selection: The following is a simple
example illustrating the nature of the optimal UI benefits in the presence of adverse
selection.
Consider a simple UI market with the following features: Individuals live for one period
during which they may or may not be employed. Individuals are risk averse and before
they know their employment  situation each individual is offered an UI policy, (a, f),
where a denotes the UI premium and ,B  denotes the Ul net benefits. Each individual enters
the market looking for employment. He is allowed one draw from a known distribution of
wages on the unit interval, [0,1]. Each insured individual chooses a reservation wage, z,
so that if the observation that he draws exceeds his reservation wage (i. e., if w > z) he
accepts the job. Otherwise  he declines the job offer and remains unemployed and collects
the UI benefit, f.
Suppose  that individuals in this economy are identical in every respect except of their
preference for leisure. More specifically, let there be two types of individuals, 1 and 2.
For individuals of type1 the utility associated  with being unemployed is t, v(8)  and for
individuals of type 2 the utility of being unemployment is t,v(J3) where I > t,  > t, > 0.
Individuals of both types are assumed to choose their reservation wages so as to
maximize their expected utilities. Formally, given the Ul policy (a, ,6) individual of type
j  E {  1,2}chooses  a reservation wage zi  so as to maximize
36U' (a, /3)  =  i  v(w - a)dF(w) + F(zJ )j v(a)
where v(.) is monotonic increasing and concave function and F(.) is the cumulative
distribution function of wages.
Question: What is the Optimal UI program for this Economy?
Assume that individuals choose theiT  reservation wages optimally. Given our assumption,
the necessary and sufficient condition for optimality is:
v(z  (a,,)-a)=t  v(J3)  forj=  1,2.
Since v is monotonic increasing t2 > tl  implies
z2'(a,  f)  > zja,f).
In other words, individuals with higher preference for leisure choose a higher reservation
wage. This makes them less likely to find an acceptable  job offer and more likely to
remain unemployed. The interaction  of the hidden characteristic "preference for leisure"
with the hidden action of choosing a reservation wage gives rise to a problem that is
referred to as endogenous  adverse selection.
Next observe that the "single crossing property" holds. In other words, the indifference
curves in the a - ,B plane of the two types cross only once. To see this note that
da  |  (  t v'(J3)F(z1 (z, /3))
u  (=a=cot 
f v'(w - a)dF(w)
Thus, t2 > t 1 and z2 > z,  imply
da  lu,
2 (cr.)=t.  >  d/  |ui  (.)=  con..
Fair UI for typej is given by:
[1  - F(z  (a. flx]=F(z (a,/3)),8 forj  = 1,2.
Thus, the slope of the fair-insurance  locus of typej  is given by:
37a
da;  F(z  )+ (a + ,3)F'(z; )Zi  F(zz)
- fairinsiurcnce  =  >  > 0.
di  1- F(z;)-  (a +  /3)F'(z;)  1-F
Thus, the fair insurance premiums are monotonic increasing convex functions  of the
levels of benefits. Moreover, z2 > z,  implies that for each level of benefits, /,  the fair
insurance  premium of individual  of type 2 exceeds that of type 1 individual,  (see Figure 1
below.)
If the type was readily observable  then the optimal self-financed U policies are depicted
in Figure 1 and are given by (a,,  A61  ) and (a  , fl2). These policies would attain a first-
best allocation of the UI risk. Under asymmetric information, however, only second-best
allocations are attainable.
A separating equilibrium allocation is depicted in Figure 2, where the low-risk (type 1)
individuals take out the UI policy (,  ,Ai) satisfying the incentive compatibility
constraints:
and
'a,,)2  U' (a2 ,j
Note that the population-wide  fair insurance locus, Fl,  is everywhere above the
indifference  curve of the low-risk individual corresponding to their equilibrium contract.
If the Fl,  locus intersect the indifference curve of the low-risk individuals then a pooling
UI policy such as the policy (a,,B) in Figure 2 Pareto dominates the separating
equilibrium. Thus, the nature of the optimal UI program in the presence of endogenous
adverse selection depends on the specific characteristics of the relevant population.
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Unemployment  insurance  has  been  the  subject  of numerous
theoretical  and  empirical  studies.  These  studies  elucidate  the
benefits  and  the  cost  of unemployment  insurance,  namely,  the
improved  the  allocation  of  risk  bearing  and  the  reduced  incentives
for work.
In the  past  two decades  a branch  of the literature  has  emerged
that deals  with the  optimal  design  of unemployment  insurance.
This  literature  has  been  influenced  by ideas  and  methods  from
the field  of information  economics  and  theories  from the  field
of labor  economics.  The  result  is  a  collection  of  models  designed
to highlight  a variety  of issues  pertaining  to the provision  of
optimal  unemployment  insurance.
This  paper  reviews  these  issues,  summarizes  the  relevant  literature,
assesses  its  accomplishments,  and  points  out problems  that
require  further  study.
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